Henry Yeung
Description:
Henry Yeung, Distinguished Professor in the Department of Geography at the National University of Singapore. His work focuses on global production networks, in which he seeks to understand the relationship and dynamics of goods at various stages of production around the world from raw materials to end products. In this episode, we talk in-depth about the interconnectedness of various production networks with bases in Asia, from semiconductors to Apple iPhones. More broadly, Henry explains the historical conditions that led to Asia’s export-oriented economic boom in the 60s and how that has shaped the globalization of industry today. As we wrap up, Henry shares his preference towards explanatory theories of geography which are tied together with real examples and offer a seemingly more realistic view of the world.
Websites:
Publications:
Global Production Networks and the Analysis of Economic Development
Rethinking Relational Economic Geography
Troubling Economic Geography: New Directions in the Post-Pandemic World
Articles:
Henry Yeung - Peter Hall Award
How Taiwan's Hon Hai Exemplified A Historic Turn in Asia Tiger Manufacturing
Books:
Theory and Explanation in Geography
Videos:
From Regional to Global Players (Public Lecture Series with LSE)
Building Trade Policy in Contemporary Science
Geopolitical Shifts and Restructuring of Global Production Networks
Show Notes:
[0:00:01] Introduction and Background of Professor Henry Yeung
[0:08:55] Major foreign investors in Singapore in the 1960s.
[0:12:08] The importance of hardware in the ICT industry.
[0:16:23] The shift from national to international production in the hardware industry.
[0:19:09] Complexity of Supply Chain and Number of Companies Involved
[0:21:27] Rules of Origin and the "Made In" Notation
[0:27:05] The Challenges of Shifting Chip Production to the US
[0:35:44] Semiconductor Manufacturing Investments in the US
[0:37:07] The Make-Buy Decision in Global Production Networks
[0:46:27] Singapore's Semiconductor Industry
[0:49:24] Firms in China dominate computer case market
[0:52:10] Role of the state in Asia's rapid development debated
[0:55:54] Fortuitous Period: Stable World and Capital Outflow
[0:58:46] Symbolism and the choice of book cover
[0:59:11] Squid Game as a Symbol for Life and Death
[01:2:00] Exploring Different Approaches to Theory
[01:05:22] Actor Network Theory as an Example of Non-Explanatory Theory
[01:07:57] The Benefits of the Book Beyond Geography Students
[01:09:10] Productivity Advice: Less is More, Stay Focused, Do Well
Unedited AI Generated Transcript:
Introduction and Background of Professor Henry Yeung
Brent:
[0:01] Welcome, Professor Henry Yeung. Thank you for coming on.
Henry:
[0:04] Thank you. Thank you, Brent and Kayla for joining us here at NUS.
And it's my pleasure to join this podcast.
Keller:
[0:12] We'd love to start off by hearing a little bit more about your story.
What got you interested in economic geography and how you got to the National University of Singapore?
Henry:
[0:20] I've been interested in, if you like, the global spread of economic activities.
So in that sense, I studied economic geography, where economic activities take place in this world.
So that's how I started doing economic geography some 35 years ago.
Brent:
[0:37] Do you think there was a particular thing that brought you to economics?
Henry:
[0:41] Ah, so I actually did geography in this department for my first degree, as well as economics as my other major.
Brent:
[0:49] Okay.
Henry:
[0:50] So I actually have this so-called combination of economics and geography.
So economic geography is within geography.
If it's in economics, the interest in, if you like, the speciality of economics, it will be called geographical economics or spatial economics.
So there are such specializations in economics.
Brent:
[1:09] Has that always been a thing?
Henry:
[1:11] Kind of, yeah. So in economic geography. So technically, there is a Nobel Prize given to Paul Krugman in 2008, if you go back, for his discovery in what's called new economic geography.
So actually, the term is used that way. Although in geography, we consider Paul Krugman as an economist, as a geographical economist.
So sometimes there is that confusion of term. So economic geography is within geography. Geographical economics is within economics.
Keller:
[1:40] And is there a cross-blending between, do people work within the same, I guess, questions between the two?
Henry:
[1:47] There are exchanges. So for example, I mean, I hang out a lot with economists also, I mean, so particularly in trade, international economics, that field has a lot of economists who are interested in, if you like, the geography of economic activities, particularly to do a trade.
So, like this May, I was in Stockholm, school economics, actually presenting together with major economists who specialize in international trade and global value chain, global production networks.
Brent:
[2:15] So.
Henry:
[2:15] I mean, in that sense, we have a lot of interactions, but of course, economics is a much bigger field than, say, economic geography.
Brent:
[2:24] And then you just said it there, but could you give an explanation of what is a global production network slash global value chain?
Henry:
[2:32] Yeah. So the simplest answer is to put it as if you break down your iPhone or yes, I see a Macintosh in front of me, a MacBook Pro, then you'll find out who makes what and where.
So what does it mean is that in each of your iPhone or laptop, you have hundreds of components.
And then you will find out who, first of all, did the R&D.
And this is Apple in California. California, of course, where the headquarter is, as well as, of course, then who did the parts.
There are many parts in it. Some are very expensive parts.
Some are geopolitically significant, like the chips nowadays.
And then you find out where it's made. And hence, together, this form a network that crosses the whole world, right?
From, you know, North America to Western Europe to Asia and so on and so forth.
So, that's what we study as what we call global production networks or global value chains.
The easiest way to learn about it nowadays is to say, during the pandemic, when you run out of toilet papers in the supermarkets, then you start asking this supply chain problem.
Then you realize, oh my God, even toilet paper is made somewhere else.
The value chain, so to speak. Yeah.
Brent:
[3:38] I think COVID definitely brought the supply chain to the forefront of everyone's eyes and really seeing the issues that arose from that.
Keller:
[3:46] Is there any history with regards to East and Southeast Asia that our listeners should have an understanding of as we kind of get into this conversation of the global dynamics of these value chains?
Henry:
[3:56] I think particularly for many audience base, particularly in North America, you have a certain notion of all things made in China. China is a global factory.
So maybe a very brief introduction to the idea of, if you like, the emergence of Asia as a whole in the past, I will say, 50 years, since the 1960s.
So primarily since the 1960s, the world has become much more integrated through primarily the process known as globalization.
Of course, the US, American corporations play a very big role in this because American firms from the very beginning internationalized. So, Singapore benefited.
We have HP. We have early days of Fairchild, some of your semiconductor firms that came, set up a Texas instrument, set up shops in Singapore, make things.
So, that's how Singapore industrialized. That's how subsequently together the so-called East Asian tiger economies, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
All four benefited from, if you like, the 1960s, what we call international divisions of labor, meaning more Americans, subsequently European firms, came to Asia, set up production activities.
So that's how the early wave started.
Brent:
[5:09] Then.
Henry:
[5:10] Of course, you have the second wave of Southeast Asian country like Malaysia, Thailand, our neighbors.
This is before China started. China was still quite sleepy before 1989.
So, and hence, we have the second wave of industrialization, and then, of course, followed by the emergence of China, starting from, of course, China opened up in 79, but really in a bigger way in the 1990s.
And then, of course, after China joined the WTO in 2001, means 22 years ago, then China became much more sort of...
Active in industrializing to the extent you see today that the so-called China dependency factor, right, in terms of GPN, GVC, much produced in China.
So that's really something that I think audience should get a feel of the different stages that Asia gets involved in, GPN, GVCs.
Brent:
[6:03] And then with the tiger economies, I noticed that Japan was left out.
When did they come into this? Because I know a lot of technology is also made there.
Henry:
[6:12] Yeah, yeah. Good question, Brent. I kind of forgot to mention that before the Americans came in the 60s, Japan was already recovering from the defeat in the Second World War.
Brent:
[6:25] Right?
Henry:
[6:26] So Japan was, of course, a major industrial power during pre-Second World War, together with Germany, right?
So by the 1960s, which is like 20 years after the Second World War, Japan already emerged very rapidly.
So yes, Japan's re-emergence as a major industrial power started well before the tiger economies were kind of articulated or involved in global production networks.
So in the 1960s, as much as American firms came to tiger economies, Japanese firms were also beginning to get out of Japan when it became more expensive to produce at home.
So they moved some of the more labor-intensive activities to, again, tiger economies.
So very good question. Japan, at one point by the early 80s, Japan was seen by America as the major economic threat yeah so there was a book written called Japan as number one that worried Americans yeah in the 80s Intel almost went bust.
Brent:
[7:25] Intel.
Henry:
[7:25] The very Intel you know of today, yeah, because of the Japanese semiconductor competition. Japan was very, very strong in the 80s.
Brent:
[7:33] Okay, very interesting.
Keller:
[7:34] And with the initial migration of companies going to Asia, was there a particular driving factor? Like, was it just cheap labor?
Were there other things in play that motivated firms to move there?
Henry:
[7:43] Yeah. Again, very good question. I think if you look at this kind of earlier days, right, in the 80s, pre-1980s, I will say the primary driver will be to do with lower costs of production, less so to do with a big market.
Because at that time, much of Asia, except Japan, was still really developing country, less developing.
So there wasn't huge domestic market to talk about. So what very much was to take advantage of lower costs of production in this part of the world to manufacture.
For North American, the US in particular, and Western European markets.
So in that sense, to do a labor cost, land availability, space, government incentives.
So Singapore offer, for example, in early days, tax-free. If you come, you know, if you make profit, it's tax-free. So we call it pioneer status.
That's how Singapore developed by attracting what is called foreign direct investment.
We are quite famous for that. But the early day was about giving you tax incentive, cheap labor, making things cheap and labour cost low and that's how we started.
Brent:
[8:50] Who do you think invests the most in Singapore?
Henry:
[8:52] Then or now?
Brent:
[8:54] Both. Oh.
Henry:
[8:55] Okay.
Major foreign investors in Singapore in the 1960s.
Brent:
[8:55] I don't know.
Henry:
[8:55] So if you go back to the 19... I do have numbers like this.
Okay, so if I think of the 1960s, the major foreign investors were, of course, British because we just got out of British Empire, right?
So British investment was big in Singapore at that time, including owning many companies.
The banks like Hong Kong Shanghai Bank, today Standard Chartered Banks, were already here for over 100. By now, it's over 100. years.
Then followed by the US, then Japan. So these three have consistently been the largest foreign investors of Singapore all the way until now, I think.
If you look at Singapore's top three, will be still these three.
It's just different mix.
Maybe US biggest followed by Japan and Britain today. Yeah. And.
Brent:
[9:39] Then would you consider Chinese investment foreign? In Singapore? Yeah.
Henry:
[9:44] By Chinese, you mean from People's Republic of China or we call mainland and China yes it's a foreign investor yes Singapore is an independent country yes but.
Keller:
[9:55] That's not within the top list.
Henry:
[9:56] No I don't think so because even today if you think of in Hong Kong yes right so from mainland China Hong Kong sorry rephrase Hong Kong biggest foreign investor is likely to be from mainland China but for Singapore it's not because China wouldn't have as much for example manufacturing investment in Singapore whereby we're driven by all these three major countries as well as Germany and then in many other segments not not so big yeah it's probably within the top five yeah right, But certainly not the top three, I would imagine.
Brent:
[10:32] And then kind of leading into discussing why some semiconductors are primarily made in Asia and why it might be hard to produce that elsewhere.
Could you start off with giving a brief background of what the information and communication technology industry is as a whole before we narrow down into semiconductors? Yeah.
Henry:
[10:54] So now, of course, ICT stands for Information and Communications Technology.
This is a very large segment of the economy in which, by and large, if you think about it, there are by and large three segments.
One is your, if you like, digital economy, means data only. So Google will be that kind, right? The platform guys, if you like.
The other will be hardware people.
Brent:
[11:18] Right?
Henry:
[11:18] So one is to do with the data, if you like, which is not hardware, which is services.
The other will be with hardware, which is manufacturing. So that will be your iPhone, your computers, your whatever telecommunication devices.
Then the last component will be software. So there'll be a whole segment in ICT that is your Microsoft or Adobe, all the software guys. They are not the same as data people, right?
So you won't consider, say, Adobe that does the Acrobat and many other softwares, Photoshop and so on, to be the same as Google.
They are not the same kind of company. Got it? So there are three segments of the ICT industry.
Data, hardware, and then software.
The importance of hardware in the ICT industry.
[12:08] All right? So I study primarily the hardware segment.
And this ICT as a whole just the manufacturing part is very big it's about 18% of the world's merchandise trade merchandise means goods but if you consider data and software then they are also very important in service trade but it's just that I don't have immediate data just the hardware alone is very important yeah if.
Brent:
[12:37] You had to estimate what percent of like global wealth is like goods versus now shifting towards like data and like services like how would you.
Henry:
[12:46] Just, I've not seen immediate calculation this way, but of course, I will imagine, it depends on how you measure this.
If you measure by the market value of all public listed firms in data, in hardware, and then in software, then data people are likely to be the most valuable.
Because if you just count the funds, the Facebook, the Google means alphabet, and then Amazon for the data side, and Apple in terms of the platform side of Apple, which is your iTunes.
Just this alone will be probably worth all of the hardware guys together.
Hardware guys will be like the other part of Apple, and then Dell, HP for computer, and then for mobile will be you know all the chinese brand plus uh korean brands like uh um samsung and elic and and the likes yeah yeah yeah.
Brent:
[13:48] Like that was actually going to be like the next question of how would you divide up companies like facebook or apple or.
Henry:
[13:54] Amazon.
Brent:
[13:55] Based on the fact that they do they have a lot.
Henry:
[13:57] Of data but they also still.
Brent:
[13:58] Have some other means of production.
Henry:
[14:00] Yeah but the answer so we we focus on the kind of they they do have i mean if you look at the annual report they do uh um divide by what is called market segments.
So the kind of data part of the business, including server business, like your cloud business.
For Amazon, they also have the usual retailing, right?
Meaning, what do we call online retail, which is Amazon's original business, if you think of it, right?
But they make more money probably now from cloud services and platform economy. Yeah.
Brent:
[14:32] Definitely.
Keller:
[14:33] Can the clouds, can data-based companies be studied in the same way in regards to the globalization?
Because with trade, you can look at ports and you can look at the movement, like the physical movement of goods.
Is that easier or harder with some of the data software companies? Yeah.
Henry:
[14:47] Very, very tough question. In fact, that's the singular reason.
The short answer is yes. It's much more difficult to study, if you like, the global production network or global value chain of data companies.
Why? Because it's very hard to track it. And that's why you find very few, very hard, I mean, very few studies I know of that study, if you like, the GPN or GVCs of services, even banks, let alone data platform companies.
We do know, for example, that Google will use certain hardware, will contract certain services to maintain your, you know, areas where you put your data centers, for example, right? Who supplies the electricity?
Who does the cleaning? Who does the security? These are all part and parcel of your, if you like, subcontracting network.
It's very hard to find that data as compared to, say, break down your iPhone.
That we know easier. So in relative terms, there are more of us study coffee value chains.
You know, Starbucks, I can trace all the way to the farmer.
Brent:
[15:46] Yeah.
Henry:
[15:47] Then data.
Keller:
[15:48] Very difficult.
Henry:
[15:50] Platform, very difficult.
Brent:
[15:51] Yeah. My mom is even running into issues because she's in tax back in the US.
And now that companies are so international or customers are all over the world using these services, do they deserve to be taxed in that country where the customer comes from or is it where it's based? And there's a lot of interesting questions that are yet to be solved.
Keller:
[16:10] And then with the ICTs, we kind of touched on it already a little bit, but could you explain the shift from the national production into the international production?
Was that the same shift that occurred in the 60s or were the things that polluted that?
The shift from national to international production in the hardware industry.
Henry:
[16:23] Yeah. So, okay. So, my comments are more relevant for the hardware part of this.
Brent:
[16:28] So.
Henry:
[16:29] One of the three, if you like, which is significant. First is to say, if you think of the 1960s, 70s, all the way up to the early 80s, there was a significant degree of major brands from the US with, of course, a bit of exception of Canada, subsequently BlackBerry, if you remember the case, BlackBerry.
There used to be a time BlackBerry was almost number one. There was a recent movie about it.
Then there was European brands, the Philips, the many European brands.
So at the beginning, they were all manufactured within domestic economies, right? In the US or in North America.
So including early days of IBM PCs, for example.
Brent:
[17:11] Yeah?
Henry:
[17:11] Was made, assembled in the US. Then started moving out. Moving out initially more in terms of final assembly.
Final assembly in this part of the world to save cost.
So at that time, there wasn't so much outsourcing to Asian manufacturers to do the final assembly. If you like today's Foxconn, you know of, they assemble the iPhone.
So at the beginning in the 60s and 70s, you will have factories in Singapore, in Taiwan, a little bit in South Korea also, and Hong Kong that were owned by the American firms and brands themselves.
So that's the early days. There wasn't too much what we call fragmentation of production.
So production was still in-house, but in different subsidiary of your company.
Headquartered in the US or in Europe.
[18:02] And then as Asian suppliers to these firms gain some know-how over time, making smaller things, not the whole thing, but some parts.
Then some of this, plus, of course, some fortuitous moment where the state was able to push for some incentives or what we call industrial policy through either subsidy or technology transfer, state-sponsored research and development that enabled today's TSMC started off that way, learning how to do.
Then Asian manufacturers began to make in-row into what we call the final assembly, including from design all the way to the whole thing made together.
So not just making parts, make the whole thing. So today, of course, over 95% of virtually almost all of the notebooks are made by Asian manufacturers.
Including Apple, all of it. Apple doesn't make a single thing, really.
So in that sense, there is this long progression from initially national production production in the home country to international production in Asia, but owned by home country companies to today's much more fragmented production networks across the world.
Complexity of Supply Chain and Number of Companies Involved
Brent:
[19:09] Yeah. And then on the fragmented production networks, could you, is there a general estimate for how many different companies are producing, involved in making a cell phone.
Henry:
[19:20] If you.
Brent:
[19:21] Can look at apple maybe or a different one i don't know that like this like the semiconductor comes from here the screen from here just to.
Henry:
[19:28] Yes okay so i do actually have data up to 29 2019 because i bought the data for every single brand every single cell phone model and for every component yeah but i i never do an average but if you ask Ask me for an estimate, I will say per cell phone, right?
Today, per smartphone, if you like, you have a few hundred components, some are overlapping, same company.
Brent:
[19:54] So easily.
Henry:
[19:55] You will still estimate at least one or 200 companies involved by name.
But each of those components may be made by another up to 100, few hundred companies that need to supply the equipment that is used to make, for example, the chip, right?
Because it's just one chip designed by, say, Qualcomm that makes the application processor, except Apple.
So the Qualcomm application processor is made by Taiwan's TSMC.
But to make that chip, Taiwan's TSMC has to source many different equipments.
So there's another production network there. That's why it's really complicated in that sense.
What you get in a cell phone is made by one to two or 300 companies, companies but each of those components we have another few hundred companies involved have.
Brent:
[20:42] You guys made maps of it like on the world like here's a cell phone or here's like the apple iphone.
Henry:
[20:47] 14 and then like there are such uh tech we call tear down figures available even in our textbook we have shown it but it's not quite possible to uh so for example it's not quite possible to detail everyone because it's just too messy you know so we we can only show very very simple.
For example, I just show you one that I'm looking at, the cell phone one.
Where's the iPhone? iPhone is here.
So, well, I mean, I'll come back to it once I find it. Okay, if you, we continue with the questions.
Rules of Origin and the "Made In" Notation
Keller:
[21:27] Then with the final manufacturing aspect, how does that impact the made-in notation of a given product?
Because I know in the US, a lot of people will be like, oh, I'll only buy it if it's made in the US, which is pretty difficult.
But can people have essentially 99.9% of a product made around the world and then just do that final little bit in-house and then qualify it as made in America or made in a given country?
Henry:
[21:53] Yeah. Actually, in terms of international trade, there is a common way of looking at this matter. It's called rules of origin.
So the idea is how much of a product is actually, if you like, produced in this location that you put your mark on.
So made in Italy, made in the USA, things like that. Okay, so there is a rule of origin.
This is governed by international organizations such as WTO.
So, at custom, you have to declare how much of this thing is from here, this particular country you are reporting.
So, there are ways to track. And hence, basically today, you can think of it as it's possible to be 100% made in America for, say, a college t-shirt.
Keller:
[22:40] If the cotton.
Henry:
[22:41] You use domestic cotton, right? And then, of course, the spinning, and then they go into the textile mill, then they go into the garment guys, right?
Okay, so it's possible. but for complicated that's not too complicated a product, as compared to a you know a device that you and I use I mean even you know the microphone you use what about the plastic part the steel if it's metal you know all those where are they if it's all made in the US but what about raw material, the very petrol the petroleum, that is used to generate the plastics it could be from the US theoretically but also could be from the Middle East so if you track all the way it's highly unlikely that it's 100% from the same country highly unlikely yeah it's possible but very difficult.
Brent:
[23:28] And then, especially nowadays, as people are talking about trying to renationalize some production, I know it's probably more common conversations in the West.
But why is that difficult, especially for items like semiconductors?
Henry:
[23:43] So maybe let me start with the general and then go into the chips side of this story of semiconductors.
So in general, the whole idea of reshoring, bringing back, it's important, I understand, political matter for people's livelihood, for jobs, perhaps also nowadays in terms of what we call supply chain resilience.
Brent:
[24:06] Right?
Henry:
[24:07] In case things go wrong, can I still get the thing, right? Your toilet paper example still, right?
So should we make toilet papers in America because of that, right?
It's possible. Of course, can be done. It's not technologically difficult.
It's just costly. So the first question is, from a company point of view, most companies don't really want to do it because it's costly.
It means my profit margin will be less.
But if you force me, I have to do it or else tariffs will be imposed.
Then, okay, then I have to do it. Then I bring back or I move my production away from countries that you don't like me to manufacture in, say China, move it to Southeast Asia to avoid tariffs. So that will be another alternative.
[24:50] So that is more to do with just production cost matter, which can be shifted around globally because there are locations which are cheaper in terms of whether labor costs are very important.
Don't be fooled. Sometimes a place, a country, a location may be cheaper in labor, but it's not cheap in total. Why? For example, the roads are broken.
Okay, so you can make something cheap because you pay workers less, but then your shipment takes longer because the road is broken. your truck get stuck.
So then every day, you're good, not shipped out, cost you money. We call it transit time.
So you have location that is cheap in labor, but logistics costs are high.
So if you balance it out, it's actually not that cheap.
And that's why today, China remains very competitive, not because China wages are low, much more than Southeast Asian countries, but it's just that their logistics so strong and their ecosystem of suppliers, meaning you can easily find someone to fix your machine problem or change a part nearby.
So in that sense, costs will be what we call total costs. That's a major component.
Now on semiconductors, it's not so much about cost. It's about, if you like.
[26:02] A few factors, primarily to do with, if you like, capital and technology.
Now, first of all, semi-con chip making is a very capital and technology intensive business.
It's not about how many people you have. It's about how good are the engineers, right?
With the right machine and then how much money you have.
Because each manufacturing plant, we call FAB, wafer fabrication.
The FAP, each FAP for advanced technology like currently at, say, 3 nanometer, even not, below 10 nanometer, let's say before, below 10 nanometer, you already need 10 billion and above.
Below 3, I mean, now it's at 3 nanotechnology currently, that's 25 billion minimum.
Minimum. No 25 billion, forget it. Yeah.
USD. Okay. So it's a large amount of investment needed.
That's why even Intel has to hesitate how much I want to invest.
So in that sense you need to have that block of money and the US is coming up with of course the CHIPS Act which is worth about 52 bil 50 bil but it's not all used to be.
The Challenges of Shifting Chip Production to the US
[27:05] It's not all used to build fabs some are to do with training people and so on and so forth so and that's why it's a difficult thing if you want to shift production back in chip making to the US you need to have this kind of level of investment, hundreds of billions actually and then you need to have the expertise.
Now, this is the tricky part.
You guys probably are less likely to want to work in a factory or fab than in nice Google office or Apple offices, right?
Meaning you want to be in services rather than manufacturing, engineering, which is really the necessity if you want to be very advanced in chip making.
Brent:
[27:45] Yeah.
Henry:
[27:45] But that's why currently the US actually is short of chip engineers.
CHIP chip, not CHEAP. actually both you're not cheap either so it's very tough it's very tough to restore back yeah at both this kind of high-end capital technology intensive stuff as well as if you like the labor the cost-oriented items, that's why long time ago you know this is I remember it's about maybe 2010 or 9 the New York Times reported it that then, Obama asked the late Steve Jobs yeah what does it take to bring iPhone assembly back, you know, the making of iPhone back to America?
And the late Steve Jobs said, those jobs ain't coming back.
Yeah. This is exact wording. Yeah. Because I use it in my book, so I remember that quote.
Keller:
[28:36] Yeah.
Henry:
[28:36] You can find it. It's in New York Times reported. Yeah.
Brent:
[28:38] I'm sure there's similar issues with farming and agriculture in the US too.
It's like really hard to try to get the average American to do those type of jobs.
Henry:
[28:46] You see, because even, I mean, in California, you know, you have a lot of seasonal workers from the South.
Brent:
[28:51] Yeah.
Henry:
[28:51] Yeah, to do exactly. You know, you want to collect the oranges? Nice.
But it's tough work yeah definitely.
Keller:
[28:57] And then you briefly mentioned it but the different sizes of chips could you talk about i think it's the legacy and the advanced chips and what those are both used for i see because i think a lot of the media that we see is like talking mainly about the advanced chips and kind of neglecting the importance of the legacy yeah.
Henry:
[29:13] Okay so actually if you think of the world of semiconductors there are different kinds of chips right?
So in common day languages, there'll be the advanced chips that are used in processes.
So we call them logic chips.
So these are the ones that demand advanced technology and hence the expensive FAPs.
And they are used in your computers, in your phones, in your servers and AI applications, if you like the brains of them. So that's one kind of chips.
The second kind will will be what we call memory chips. And all of us want memory chip because we want to store more photos or Instagram stuff, right?
So memory chips are very important, okay?
But they are not necessarily needing the most advanced technology.
The most advanced is good, but equally you don't need them to make high density memory chips that are used to store gigabytes, right?
And then of course we have terabytes. So memory chip will be the second major component of what we call semiconductors.
The third will be what we call analog chips. So analog chips are chips that are not digital by definition we use here.
So if you see something vibrating, so the sensing of vibration is not digital, it's analog or temperature or when you run, right?
Brent:
[30:33] You know.
Henry:
[30:34] Sensing your body and some of those are analog chips that does the job.
And then the final type is called discrete chips. It's just on-off button stuff.
So the analog and discrete chips are very often used in, for example, cars. You have all kinds of sensors in a car, you know, vibration, you know, changing temperature, shocks and things like that.
So, and the fifth type is what we call optical semiconductors, which is actually your screen, your TV screen, your laptop screens.
And that's another whole category, optical semiconductor.
Okay, so the most advanced FAPs below 10 nano technology is used to make primarily logic as well as quite a number of the memory chips.
All the other chips, you don't need so advanced technology.
Okay, when we say how many nanometer, just to clarify. Okay.
The nanometer refers to the width, the distance between two transistors.
Brent:
[31:33] Okay.
Henry:
[31:34] Within a particular space, let's say your thumbnail. On your thumbnail, the most advanced application processor, the A15 chip of Apple iPhone 15 has something like 20 billion transistors or something like that put into it in a 3D stack together.
The distance between each two is 3 nano.
Brent:
[31:55] Wow.
Henry:
[31:55] That's what three nano meant, okay? You know what nano is? About one millionth mm, which is your hair is about one mm, one millionth size of your hair. If you can see that.
Brent:
[32:06] I don't want to talk to you guys like ghosts.
Henry:
[32:08] So that's more, right? And that's why you can pack billions.
You want to pack billions because the phone is more and you want the processors to be more powerful, processing more information.
The more transistors you put in, the more you can calculate 010101.
But hey, you know, for many other applications, for you know you put a chip in a anything that that moves so you know a toy dog you know remote control a toy dog has chips in the remote controller as well as the dog but for that you don't need the three nanometer kind of distance you know it can be the legacy chips uh make me in whatever you know 64 or 100 something nanometer yeah and.
Brent:
[32:48] Then you were were saying it would take about 25 billion to.
Henry:
[32:51] Make.
Brent:
[32:52] A manufacturing facility.
Henry:
[32:53] For.
Brent:
[32:54] A three nanometer.
Henry:
[32:55] Chip yeah and.
Brent:
[32:56] Then you said the chipsax was 52 billion.
Henry:
[32:59] Yes so.
Brent:
[33:00] And how much are these top companies.
Henry:
[33:02] Investing when they're trying.
Brent:
[33:05] To build new factories and all that.
Henry:
[33:06] Yeah so i give you some actual numbers right so if you look at um now it's 2023 so if you look at uh between 2020 to 2023 including this year, right?
So the biggest investor is between Samsung and TSMC. Samsung is South Korea. TSMC is from Taiwan.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, TSMC. And Intel will be somewhere in between.
Intel historically has always been investing a lot. Intel was the leader for a long time to come here.
Okay, so these three companies far exceeded the number four.
Okay, so each of them invest between roughly $30 to $40 billion per company, per year. in building FAPs as well as maintaining existing FAPs.
They call, the term we use is capital expenditure.
Brent:
[33:51] Yeah.
Henry:
[33:52] So you use this expenditure to maintain the existing equipment and or build new FAPs. Yeah. Okay.
So from 2020 to 2023, okay, this coming year 24 is going to be less because the semi-coin industry now is oversupply.
Yes. To your amazement because everybody building.
Yeah. This industry always has the cycle up, down, up, down.
Brent:
[34:13] Yeah.
Henry:
[34:14] So that will be the kind of size we are talking about. Then how many of them will go for the CHIPS Act?
Currently, my understanding is some are still thinking because CHIPS Act is not easy.
You know, there are many conditionalities, which is not easy.
You have to have childcare facilities or something like that if you use the CHIPS Act.
Yeah. And then you are not supposed to make excessive profit, which means you have to show, open your book and show how much money you make.
Brent:
[34:40] Yeah. Yeah.
Henry:
[34:41] It's quite tough. and then you once you receive it you are not supposed to invest I think in it didn't specify the country but countries of concern we know it's China within 10 years or something like that interesting so then you know for you to take 5 billion from the I mean you're not going to get 52 billion if you're Intel or you're Samsung you get 5 billion but you're going to lose those things opportunity yeah, I'm not sure yeah the actual industry talk from what I gather reading industry industry, what's that called sites block sites is that many big ones may not go for it because the strings are very difficult yeah that.
Brent:
[35:21] Would make sense.
Henry:
[35:22] Yeah seems.
Brent:
[35:23] Like it would tie your hands more than it would actually help you if you're already investing 35.
Henry:
[35:26] Billion because you already have that kind of capital what's the point to get 5 billion but then on the other hand you're stuck but actually what Intel is doing is quite smart it goes Germany and then get 20 billion support from Germany to build new FABs. Yeah.
Brent:
[35:41] Yeah.
Henry:
[35:41] That doesn't come with some of these strengths.
Brent:
[35:43] Yeah.
Keller:
[35:44] Right.
Semiconductor Manufacturing Investments in the US
Brent:
[35:44] Yeah. So there's not much hope for it to come back to America realistically. There will be.
Henry:
[35:50] I mean, so TSMC has already committed a Resona FAB investment, although now delayed one year in terms of opening. Again, lack of engineers.
Yeah. And as well as some other factors.
Samsung has also invested further in Texas. That's where they have been.
Global Foundry, which is US-based has committed so in that sense actually it's a Middle East share owner but US-based so also committed to investing in new fab so in that sense there will be more semiconductor manufacturing, activities in the US in the next say 5 years or 10 years than before 2020 yeah but in terms of unplugging from the places that you're talking about Taiwan South Korea to America, that I don't think it will happen.
You'll be in kind of new facility, but not the most advanced, unfortunately.
If you follow the specifics.
Keller:
[36:49] Yeah, and then within, like, given the fact that all the firms have to be globalized, I think the paper we were reading mentioned how the firms in order to win out need to have different strategies.
Could you talk a little bit about what a few of those strategies are, just the ways of thinking that these firms are taking on?
The Make-Buy Decision in Global Production Networks
Henry:
[37:07] All right. So, of course, in general, there are different ways, as we sort of study in terms of what we call global production networks, right?
A firm can choose to what we call internalize everything, make your own.
So, in economics, you call this make or buy decision.
If you are the executive, you have to decide, you want to make this thing yourself or you want to buy from somebody, yeah?
So, the make-buy decision is very important and it happens in many, many things that you do as a company.
[37:38] So you will find that in the ICT industry hardware that I study you have exact competitors adopting buy or make so in other words there is no generic strategies to say oh the buy strategy will tend to make more profit not necessary so if you look at okay I'll give you an example right so if you look at Apple iPhone which is a lot of outsourcing right in terms of manufacturing, Apple still make a lot of profit, right? So it's no problem outsourcing.
But then Samsung, that makes Galaxy and other smartphones, insource a lot, including the final assembly, which is primarily done in Vietnam.
So Vietnam is the large base. Samsung account for something like 20% of Vietnam's exports in manufacturing, incredibly, one-fifth or something like that, roughly.
Yeah, because they make a few hundred million smartphones per year there, because Samsung sells about what, three, three, four hundred million?
The whole world is 1.4 billion smartphones per year, so, roughly, huh?
Brent:
[38:43] Wow. Yeah.
Henry:
[38:44] Yeah, yeah. iPhone is another few hundred million, got it? It's a few hundred million, not few million, few hundred, right?
So you have exact competitor, number one and number two, and one is outsourced a lot, one is insourced a lot.
Samsung uses its own memory chips, of course, its own display, right?
Because it makes those things in different parts of Asia, including South Korea.
So that's for smartphone. For computer, it's the same. So Lenovo, which is the Chinese laptop brand, which used to be IBM.
Yeah, IBM was sold because it was not profitable.
IBM, you know, invented the PC, but eventually lost the war, so to speak, PC war, and then IBM PC was sold to the Chinese brand then called Legend, but then eventually changed name to Lenovo.
Today's Lenovo, that's why you will see ThinkPad.
ThinkPad is the IBM patented name, so to speak. be.
Okay. So Lenovo today still assemble almost half of his own laptop, whereas HP, Dell, and Apple, which are the three American laptop brands, outsource almost 100%. Almost.
And yet all can make money. So the moral of the story is there is no predetermined outcome in terms of the strategies firms adopt. Each firm is unique.
Depending on its own what we call internal, its own sort of of a strategy, its own supply chain management style.
And so on and so on.
Brent:
[40:12] Yeah. And then, especially for those companies that do decide to outsource a lot, how are geopolitical issues starting to influence, especially now between the US and China?
Henry:
[40:22] Yeah. So this question, the nearest answer you get is Tim Cook at the Apple headquarter because that's the question that must puzzle him all the time. Yeah.
Because, you know, much of his iPhone is assembled in China by Foxconn.
Now move a little bit to India, a certain percentage. much of Apple Macintosh is assembled in China as well as a little bit now in Southeast Asia so he has to deal with this because Apple is the largest company by market capitalization currently either Apple or Tesla roughly but it's big enough you know what I'm saying it's like two something trillion dollar company Apple yeah I've been doing Apple using Apple for 30 plus years so from the day when it's a cute little Macintosh, okay Okay, so how are they looking into this matter?
Of course, I don't have a generic answer except to say currently geopolitical consideration.
[41:17] I'm afraid to say Trump's or economic consideration, meaning for corporate executives, geopolitical concerns, particularly in particular US-China relations or rephrase deteriorating US-China relation, will impact significantly on the way in which these corporate executives want to restructure their global production networks.
There is clear evidence of what's called China plus decision, meaning it's possible many corporations want to shift some, or not shift production out of China, not necessarily, but certainly to have alternative sites.
That's why it's called China plus. Sometimes in the media, it's called China plus one.
Sometimes, of course, it's not just one. Sometimes China plus three.
You want three other alternatives.
And this in the name of what is called supply chain resilience.
Brent:
[42:13] But remember.
Henry:
[42:14] Resilience comes with costs. If you want more than one, meaning you've got to have two or three.
That means you have a second best, you have a third best.
And by definition, second best is not as good as the best, meaning incur more costs.
And that's why you will have a general, to a certain extent, extent the current inflation that we all get is part and parcel of this problem too in other words corporations are no longer able to optimize their production costs in the most optical way, optimal way because of the risk consideration associated with geopolitical tensions war, and other matters environmental matter also I mean it's not just geopolitical climate change and so on and so forth yeah you.
Keller:
[43:01] See a lot of firms moving around to deal with the effects of climate especially in coastal.
Henry:
[43:05] Regions yes but also to do with that depending on the actual industry you're looking at there'll be more stringent environmental regulation regulation.
I'll give you an example, right? I mean, despite all the great thing about what we hear about TSMC from Taiwan, TSMC consume one company, something like roughly 10% of Taiwan's electricity and 10% of Taiwan's water.
Keller:
[43:31] Wow.
Henry:
[43:31] Oh yeah. Oh yeah. You want to make advanced chips?
You got to use a lot of electricity and water because a lot of etching process, wash, etching, wash, even though you can recycle a lot, but still not enough.
And this, you can actually go and and check it out.
There are environmental reports on this.
So basically, you're going to have, and then of course, if it's to do a semiconductor, you want also to be away from earthquake zones and California, as you know, is not that friendly towards that.
And that's why Intel always has to worry about this because it affects in California, right? The origin, yeah?
So the moral of the story is, it's not just geopolitical, but geopolitical is the new factor that is really much more earth-shaking, so to speak, than the environmental factor, which always has been there.
Keller:
[44:16] And when did you start to see that pick up more weight, especially with regards to China?
Henry:
[44:22] Geopolitical factor, yeah?
Keller:
[44:23] Yeah.
Henry:
[44:24] I would say this is before the pandemic.
As you know, the trade war started sometime in 2018 when then Donald Trump imposed tariffs on China.
So from 2018, at that point when I was interviewing firms, they were okay, I mean, but they saw it more as just a business cost.
It wasn't seen as big geopolitical tension.
By today, this five years forward now, we know that, you guys are from the US, you know, there is quite strong bipartisan kind of view on so-called the China threat.
And hence, I think it's fair to say, I personally don't believe that this, I'm afraid to report, the 2020s is not going to be a good time for all of us.
Meaning this tension won't go away, at least in this decade.
I cannot imagine that suddenly tomorrow the two countries huddling, you know, be good friends together.
It's probably not until 2030s at least, meaning the next seven years will be tough.
And hence, I mean, a company has quarterly report to generate profitability.
So you can't wait for seven years. You only have three months for the next quarter.
You have to report, right, to Wall Street. So what are you going to do?
You have to do something if you're the corporate executives.
So that's why right now there is a lot of restructuring going on in terms of global production networks and global value chains.
Brent:
[45:49] What are some of those biggest trends in the restructuring?
Henry:
[45:53] The one major one is the building of alternative supply bases outside China.
Southeast Asia benefits from this. So actually, ironically, our neighbor Malaysia is doing very well in Semicon because there is a lot of packaging business.
After the chip is made, you need to package it. assemble, package, and test it.
So there is a lot of investment. Intel just announced one big investment in Malaysia as well. So Malaysia is doing well on that.
Singapore, we benefit also a lot, actual chip making.
You may be surprised. We actually make about 10% of the world's chips.
Singapore's Semiconductor Industry
Brent:
[46:27] Where? On the island?
Henry:
[46:28] Singapore.
Brent:
[46:28] No, where on the island?
Henry:
[46:30] Oh, we actually have a few areas where there are many fabs. So Woodlands has what's called a semiconductor plant.
If you go there and then near the airport side it's called Pasir Ris near Tampines area also has a lot of you can see you know their names on the building yeah and then the suppliers nearby so Singapore make about 10% of the world's chips 20% of the world's chip making equipment wow equipment the machine that is used to make the chips yeah for a little city you know yeah.
Brent:
[47:00] We just looked it up it was like 10km like tall and like 20km wide.
Henry:
[47:04] Yeah the whole island yeah so actually Actually, there is, so Micron, for example, that makes memory chip from America.
Micron announced a big investment in Singapore. Yeah.
They are already here. It's just that they make more investment.
So some of the Southeast Asian countries are doing well because of this sort of a necessity to build a kind of insurance to only in China.
So you cannot be only in China now. Now, your customers in North America, in Europe will say, no, no, no, no.
I want you to make sure that, you know, there should be at least one more site that can supply me or else I won't choose you.
So this is not just semiconductor, but many other industry.
Brent:
[47:48] And then are Chinese companies setting up like subsidiaries or like investing in non-Chinese companies because of these geopolitical issues?
So American companies can, say, come to Singapore and partner with a different company who is Singaporean but also heavily influenced by China or invested in by China? Are those type of things occurring?
Henry:
[48:11] Yeah. I mean, again, very good observation. I mean, it's exactly happening in such a way that you're going to find, not right now already, okay, right now quite a lot of Chinese suppliers of Apple, for example, not moving out, but they will set up additional shops in locations where Apple is going.
So India, in Southeast Asia, which one was announced to be making some Apple computers?
I think is it, which one? It's not Thailand.
It's in, what's it, Vietnam or Cambodia. So you have Chinese suppliers, mainland Chinese firms that supply to, say, Apple's global production network, setting up new operations, if you like, follow the customers.
So there is that event happening. And that's why the so-called China Plus eventually will lead to a different location, but still probably, by and large, the same mix of firms.
It's just that they have multiple operations.
Firms in China dominate computer case market
[49:24] So, because there are just many components that firms in China have already cornered the market.
I'm not even talking about electrical vehicle, battery, that kind of stuff.
I'm just talking about, you know, the guys who make the case that go into this computer.
There are only four or five companies. You know, this computer case is very expensive.
It's over 100 USD because it's nice metal, right? I mean, you're Apple, nice touch.
Keller:
[49:49] Yeah.
Henry:
[49:49] Somebody has to make this case, the computer case. it's very critical component but using metal yeah it's magnesium uh um alloy okay yeah yeah lightweight but very uh hard yeah yeah.
Brent:
[50:03] Then.
Keller:
[50:04] For customers that are worried like in the u.s or in europe about all these firms being in asia and asian governments possibly having control and i know in one of the talks you mentioned how the decision making process is still, in the Americas or in America, in Europe.
It's not just these governments that are going to come in and say, okay, we're doing this.
Even though they might have that ability, the decision-making process is still generally spread out.
Henry:
[50:31] Sorry. And Yen, your question is whether in Asia there is a lot of state intervention in corporate decision.
Keller:
[50:37] Yeah, essentially.
Brent:
[50:38] Are these concerns valid, especially the American concern?
Henry:
[50:42] I think it's fair to say that the role of the state in East Asian economies, perhaps minus Hong Kong, right?
If you think of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, even Japan at the beginning, and China, of course, the role of the state is heavier than what we typically understand as the Anglo-American economy or capitalism. Right.
However, it depends on how you look at it. There are also studies done which claim that America is actually what we call a hidden developmental state.
Hidden because much of the state gets involved not so much in directing corporate decisions, but in engendering technological innovations.
How does it work? Very much to the defense.
[51:34] So, Department of Defense fund many projects, including your touchpad today.
You know, your iPhone touchpad is actually the department, even Google, day one, the co-founder's Stanford PhD was funded by, I think, a defense PhD scholarship or whatever.
Yeah, the Google founder, one of the co-founders.
So the moral of the story is there is a lot of state support, but in a different way, not giving to company A to make phones, but to support technological innovation.
The US is very strong in this. And that's why the US is leading in many technologies.
Role of the state in Asia's rapid development debated
[52:10] The role of the state in Asia tends to be slightly different, right? Until recently, US, we wouldn't say it pursued industrial policy.
Now it does. Semicon is one of such example.
But in Asia, those economies I mentioned, even from Japan from the beginning, there was explicit intention of developing certain industries.
And in that sense, the state directed economic development, including, I cannot exactly say it's corporate decision, but certainly through ownership.
So Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing, TSMC, at the beginning was 40% owned by Philips.
It was Philips Technology Transfer, but the remaining 60% was owned by the Taiwan government.
[52:54] Same goes to many Singaporean firms, including Singapore Airlines today.
In South Korea, okay, the big names you know of the Samsung, LG, Hyundai, these are private family-ish own.
But when they first started in the 60s, not first started when South Korea were industrializing, they had a long period of one strong government that actually directed the economy for like 20 years.
Yeah so at that time the role of the state was very strong yeah pushing this shape so for example Samsung wouldn't have gone into electronics industry if then what's called Park Chung Hee was the military guy who had a cool and then run the country for 20 years and he was directing some of these guys to go into those industries yeah do.
Brent:
[53:47] You think that has played a significant role in the very rapid development of Asia yeah.
Henry:
[53:54] Looking back, yes, but then you see in the literature, there is a lot of academic literature, a lot of debate on this matter, right?
Is it because the state was very gung-ho, one may argue authoritarian, and hence the nice way of putting it is very visionary, right?
Not so nice way is dictatorial, yeah?
So politically, you know, very repressive. and labor union activities were curbed, dah, dah, dah, right? Okay.
[54:27] The short answer I will argue is that it's not just because the state was visionary nor powerful enough, but also there was, at that time, a kind of international vacuum.
So the global environment was quite favorable for this kind of thing, right?
Because China wasn't strong yet. there was no viable competitor among developing countries and yet developed country like the US and Western Europe were looking for low cost of production, right? In the 60s, 70s. So where would you go?
You will have come this part of the world anyway, so to speak.
Then you will have said, why not they went to a Latin American countries or African countries at that time.
So Latin American country had pursued its own policy, what's called import substitution industrialization, means not export oriented.
They want to create their own industry and closed off so makes it very difficult otherwise if you're an American firm you will naturally go Brazil will be the easiest Brazil and Mexico should develop much faster than why come Asia it's so far you see what I'm saying so because Asia at that time was export oriented meaning you come make your stuff and then you export back to your home country no problem be happy to provide the labor do the job but in Latin American country they say they don't want they don't want that model because it's very exploitative which of course is true to.
So, the moral of the story is that East Asian development.
Fortuitous Period: Stable World and Capital Outflow
[55:54] Took place during this what I would call fortuitous period when the world was relatively stable.
American and European capital was coming out, right?
And US also at that time, due to at that time what we call Cold War considerations, were quite okay with Asians making the stuff, selling back to America without any tax.
Meaning that you willingly gave up your manufacturing jobs because you need, supposedly these East Asian countries and economies to develop fast as what's called a kind of bastion or protective war against communism.
So there was that geopolitical consideration, which is very well documented in the academic literature.
So it's not just about the state doing the right thing in Asia, but also the US giving us a chance to develop. by protecting us, so to speak, giving us capital technology and knowledge and the market, very important, right?
Yeah. And of course, once developed by the, you know, late 1990s, then it'd be quite different already, right?
The dynamics will play out different because Cold War finished by 89 with the fall of the Berlin Wall.
So the US didn't have to protect Asia anymore, right?
So by then, but of course, Asian economies were already quite big and by now.
0:03:00 Exploring Different Approaches to Theory
0:05:22 Actor Network Theory as an Example of Non-Explanatory Theory
0:07:57 The Benefits of the Book Beyond Geography Students
0:09:10 Productivity Advice: Less is More, Stay Focused, Do Well
Keller:
[0:00] To finish anything on that and then we'll just kind of go towards the wrap-up
Introduction and wrapping up previous topic
[0:03] questions after that. That's good.
Brent:
[0:05] Yeah. We're back, so.
Henry:
[0:07] Okay. I think I'm done with that previous question. Yeah.
Brent:
[0:13] Yeah.
Keller:
[0:14] So then, of the many things you've published, we saw that you're publishing a new book coming out, I think, in November.
Henry:
[0:20] This new one? The theory book? Yeah, it just came out. I just got it. Myself, yeah.
Keller:
[0:25] So we're wondering if you could give a brief overview of some of those theories that, you know, A student should try to take on when they're looking at geography.
Brent:
[0:32] And then just real quick, it's called Theory and Explanation in Geography.
Henry:
[0:36] Yeah. So, okay. This book, as you can tell, has three symbols, triangle, square, and a circle.
Symbolism and the choice of book cover
[0:46] Does that remind you of anything? I wrote about it in the preface.
I chose this book cover, which is not like a very beautiful aesthetic art, right?
Normally, you know, some of our big name geographers use beautiful art.
So I chose this because it's real it's very real the three symbol came from I don't know whether you watch it it's called wait what am I talking.
Squid Game as a Symbol for Life and Death
[1:11] The Korean drama the squid game squid game you watch it?
We haven't watched it ah okay the reason is because when I was thinking writing about the book squid game was very prominent so I wanted to use the symbol to talk about this kind of life and death matter why is this life and death because Because in this book, I'm not proposing new theories in the book, but the book is written for geographers and the discipline geography to remind ourselves that when we talk about theory, what do we mean by theory?
So, I added the word theory to what was originally a very famous book published in 1969 by actually the most famous geographer called David Harvey called Explanation in Geography, 1969.
[2:00] Everybody in geography should know that book anyway.
So, I added theory and it's to say that perhaps our theory should be explanatory as well. Well, so theories can be in different ways.
So some theories you know of may not be explanatory. They are not meant to explain things.
They are meant to be, for example, interpretive.
A theory can be about interpreting something. That can be theory.
A theory can be used as a narrative, more in humanities.
I mean, in natural sciences, you think of theories as almost by definition explanatory, causal in nature, right?
So that's the kind of theory that I would like to see more being developed in geography.
So in this book, I wrote about that as well as went back to some of the existing.
[2:45] Sort of big social theory or critical theory, as we call it, to interrogate what, those authors might mean when they use the word theory. So the book is not about proposing new theory, but about re-examining what theory means.
Exploring Different Approaches to Theory
[3:00] And my preference is more explanatory theory.
Brent:
[3:03] Yeah.
Henry:
[3:04] So that's what the book is written about.
Brent:
[3:06] Is there a major example of what one of these theories are that you might have an issue with it because it's not explanatory?
Henry:
[3:13] No. So that is the more complicated. Okay. So I have to be, given that this will go public, I must make sure that that my geographer friends and colleagues will not get too agitated because I'm going to name anyone.
Okay, let me use one, all right?
For example, in chapter two, because for the audience purpose, if you Google the book, you will see that in terms of table of content, I have Marxism means Marx theory.
I have then post-structuralism in which we have actor network theory, theory assemblies theory and then of course i have more radical approaches known as feminist theory post-colonial theory in the u.s there i say critical race theory yeah and so on yeah all of this kind of uh uh approaches that use the word theory yeah okay so one example i use here is actor network theory okay which is not as contentious because as these are okay actor network theory which is quite commonly used in what's called science and technology studies very much came out of the French philosophical tradition.
So even the most prominent scholar, the French philosopher called Bruno Latour himself, as well as many of the followers mentioned that actor network theory is not a theory.
It's an approach. Approach to, if I follow the scientists, follow the equipment, follow the lab and what's in the lab, not just the people.
Brent:
[4:39] Right?
Henry:
[4:39] So what's actor network? Is that, you know, if you think of what makes today's recording possible, Of course, we have two wonderful students of you, you have probably me, but also we have the wonderful equipment, the battery that decides whether we can continue or not continue just now, things like that.
So that's what actinian theory will tell you that to describe today's happening, you need to describe all this, human and non-humans, called actors, actants.
But it's not really explanatory. So in geography, we have quite a lot of people use this approach to, if you like, narrate, describe events and happenings.
But I thought, if that's the case, then why call this a theory?
Actor Network Theory as an Example of Non-Explanatory Theory
Brent:
[5:22] And hence.
Henry:
[5:23] I use it as an example. You may apply the same approach to critical race theory, but I'm not going to go into detail now.
Whether critical race theory is a theory, for example. Everybody should be entitled to ask that question.
Brent:
[5:36] Then.
Henry:
[5:36] Of course, naturally you will say, what does the theory mean? mean.
Brent:
[5:40] Yeah. So your focus is more just what is more of the practical implication of our ideas explaining how we view how the world is working.
Henry:
[5:50] Yeah. In the book, I go into more specifics. For example, if you want to develop what we call explanatory theory, then you have to ask yourself, how do you know what is an explanation?
So if that's the case, then you need to identify what we call the causality of happenings.
What makes things happen in the social world?
And this is a a social science book, not natural, not about the natural world, nature and so on.
So if you want to explain societal happening, right? We call happening in society and space.
Geographer, we're interested in happening in society and space.
Space means geographically.
So if you want to explain that, then you have to ask yourself how things happen and why they happen the way they happen.
Now, once you ask the why question, there seems to be some sense of causality, right?
But remember, we are not natural science. We cannot have, oh, factor A will apply in all cases like gravity.
No, no such thing. It's not possible.
So then we need to understand causal factors in their, what we call, context.
[6:51] So that's where the book talks about the idea of causal powers, certain kind of mechanism, social mechanism, we call that.
For example, in sociology, analytical sociology, one of the commonly known mechanism is the idea of self-fulfilling prophecy.
If we, three of us, keep thinking that we are smart, we will do things that we think we are smart, but then we may not.
But because we keep telling ourselves we are smart, that's why we self-fulfill our own prophecy that we are smart, right? But we may not. You see what I'm saying?
So that will be a kind of analytical or if you like, explanatory mechanism.
So that's what my book is trying to do is to bring out some of these elements to interrogate existing theory with the word theory in it, and then to explain to our geographer audience, that perhaps we can consider also developing theories that are explanatory, which are very common, which are, excuse me, more commonly done in say economics, poli science and sociology.
The Benefits of the Book Beyond Geography Students
Keller:
[7:57] I'm sure the benefits from that book will go much further than just geography students.
Henry:
[8:02] I hope so, but I need to convince our own audience first, geography audience first, then hopefully it will work.
I don't know, but anyway, you know, this is quite fun to write.
Brent:
[8:13] And then kind of talking about the process of writing and the fact that when we saw you've written over 110 papers, 50 book chapters, six books now, Now, how do you balance all of that and the research and interviewing people and also teaching?
Henry:
[8:31] And sleeping. As I mentioned in the new book, my little-known secret in the world, and most geographers know, that I do sleep in the afternoon.
And they see I have a couch, and this couch can come out.
It's like a business class seat. So I do nap after lunch. That explains my productivity.
No, actually, I'm quite a focused guy. I think the singular thing that I want to leave with you guys and to the audience is that less is more.
Don't do too many things at the same time. Stay focused.
Then probably you will get more done on that thing that you focus on.
And that's my approach. I don't do too many things, but everything I do, I want to do it well.
Productivity Advice: Less is More, Stay Focused, Do Well
[9:10] And that's my own approach to doing it.
And in terms of productivity, there are plenty of people who write many more hundred articles than me. even my own department colleagues, but I tend to do things that I want to do and then I will execute them.
So it means I plan carefully in terms of the time commitment, resources, not overstretch myself so that's why i don't often say yes like today's uh podcast but hey once yes then i will do my best for you that's my approach.
Brent:
[9:43] Yeah well we thank you for saying yes yeah.
Henry:
[9:45] Oh it's my pleasure maybe.
Keller:
[9:47] I kind of covered it but do you have any other parting advice to students.
Henry:
[9:50] And i do like what i wrote in my book's preface um which is really i mean the the pandemic changed many of us and I've gone through also, you know, life-changing experience, not myself, but you know, my own parents passing, not due to COVID, but due to old age in the period.
So in my book, I end it with an advice to all readers, my friends and colleagues and family and so on.
And to both of you and many audiences that don't forget your tie, your tie, T-I-E, what do you mean?
In my book, I explain, it means take it easy.
The world is, I'm afraid to say, not very certain right now.
Wars are happening and tensions are high. Economies are a bit shaky.
Stock market's a bit floaty.
In some countries, I won't mention which one, professors may not mark your exam. You may know which one.
And hence, take it easy. If the flights lost your luggage, take it easy.
So my parting statement is to say, do your best, but when things don't work out, don't blame yourself or others too much just take it easy yeah T-R-E beautiful.
Brent:
[11:00] Way to end it thank you thank you.
Henry:
[11:02] Thank you everybody thank you.